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DIGEST OF RECENT CASES
DEATH OF PILOT AFTER LEAVING DITCHED PLANEEXCLUSION CLAUSE IN INSURANCE POLICYLIABILITY OF INSURER
Eschweiler v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Co.
241 F. 2d 101 (7th Cir. Feb. 14, 1957).
The plaintiff's decedent was insured under a health and accident policy
issued by the defendant company. The policy contained a clause which
excluded from coverage injuries sustained "while in or on any vehicle or
mechanical device for aerial navigation or in falling therefrom or therewith
or while operating or handling any such vehicle or device." The insured
was flying his private plane when an intense snowstorm caused him to make
a forced landing on the ice-covered surface of a lake. In landing, the plane
was severely damaged and it was necessary for the insured to abandon it.
He started on foot for the nearest highway, which would necessitate about
a half mile of travel across the ice. During this half mile journey the
insured fell through the ice a number of times, but each time he emerged
to pull himself out of the water, and finally he succeeded in reaching the
shore. He then crawled the remaining few feet to the highway where he was
found. Almost immediately upon being found, the insured lost consciousness
and he was dead upon the arrival of a physician. An autopsy performed the
following day revealed no evidence of physical disease or injury, other than
ailments fairly common to men of his age and a superficial abrasion. The
plaintiff sued as beneficiary under the insurance policy, alleging that the
death was accidental and within the provisions of the policy. The trial
court, sitting without a jury, found that the insured was not injured in the
forced landing or in extricating himself from the plane thereafter, but that
the great physical effort expended in journeying to the highway caused a
cardiac failure and his death. Hence, the injuries which resulted in the
insured's death were not caused while he was in or on an airplane, while he
was falling with or from an airplane, or while he was operating or handling
an airplane. Therefore, the exclusionary clause did not bar the defendant's
liability. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the trial court, holding that there was substantial evidence
to support the trial court's findings and, therefore, it could not say that these
findings were clearly erroneous. Furthermore, the court said, since the
defendant relied upon the exclusionary clause to defeat recovery, the burden
of proof rested upon it. In order to prevail, the defendant would have had
to prove that the insured's injury was sustained while (1) in or on the
airplane, (2) in falling therefrom or therewith, or (3) while operating or
handling the plane. This burden the defendant failed to sustain.
PRESSURE DIFFERENCES IN AIRPLANE CABIN-RUPTURED
EARDRUM-AIRLINE'S NEGLIGENCE
Marchant v. American Airlines, Inc.
146 F. Supp. 612 (D.R.I. Oct. 17, 1956).
The plaintiff, while a passenger on one of the defendant airline's flights,
suffered a ruptured eardrum, damage to his inner ear which resulted in some
loss of hearing, and tinnitus-defined as a continual hissing sound in the
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ear. The plaintiff's evidence tended to show that at the time of the flight
he was not suffering from any cold or other disorder and that he had never
experienced any trouble with his ears on previous flights he had made. The
plaintiff claimed that the ruptured eardrum was due to a traumatic inflammation of his middle ear caused by pressure differences between his middle ear
cavity and the surrounding atmosphere in the airplane cabin. He contended
that prior to the rupture of the eardrum, he had advised the defendant's
stewardess that he was suffering from the effects of such pressure differences, but that the stewardess took no action to alleviate his condition.
Although there was a conflict in the evidence as to whether the plaintiff
had in fact complained of his discomfort prior to the rupture of his eardrum,
it is undisputed that the stewardess gave no care or attention to the plaintiff
until after his eardrum had ruptured. Furthermore, it is undisputed that
the defendant, prior to the rupture of the plaintiff's eardrum, did not take
any action to eliminate the differences in pressure, and that the defendant's
airplane continued to rise to greater altitudes and was still climbing at the
time of said rupture. The evidence further indicated that if the stewardness
had given the plaintiff prompt and proper care or if action were taken to
eliminate the pressure differences, the plaintiff's injury would not have
occurred. In answer to the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant presented
medical testimony that the rupture was not due to a traumatic inflammation,
but rather to some unknown infection or inflammation which prevented the
Eustachion tubes from making normal adjustments to differences in air
pressure. In a suit for personal injuries, the jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff in the sum of $24,500. The defendant then moved in the alternative for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. In denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court held
that, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, it could not say that there was a
complete lack of probative facts to support the jury's verdict. The cohlrt
also denied the motion for a new trial, holding that to order a new trial
would be an invasion of the province of the jury. There was ample evidence,
the court said, to support the jury's verdict insofar as the negligence of the
defendant and the proximate cause of the injury were concerned. With
respect to the defendant's contention that the verdict was excessive and the
result of passion, prejudice, and sympathy, the court said that on all the
evidence the jury was clearly warranted in finding that the plaintiff had
suffered an injury which would cause him annoyance and discomfort as long
as he lived. Therefore, there was substantial evidence to support the award.
In rejecting the defendant's contention that a new trial should be granted
on the basis of newly discovered evidence, the court held that in order to
constitute a proper basis for a new trial, such evidence must clearly show
that it would probably change the result, and cannot merely serve to affect
the credibility of other evidence.
INJURIES TO AIRLINE PASSENGER-NO PRESUMPTION OF
NEGLIGENCE ON PART OF CARRIER
Wilson v. Capital Airlines
240 F. 2d 492 (4th Cir. Jan. 7, 1957).
The plaintiff had suffered a fractured hip while she was a passenger on
one of the defendant's planes. Prior to the flight in question, the plaintiff
had had a tumor in the bones around the left hip joint, which had left the
bone breatly weakened and susceptible to pathological fracture. She had
been advised against bearing any weight on her left leg and had been using
two crutches for several months. At one of the stops on her flight, the
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plaintiff asked the steward to assist her to the plane's lavatory. The plaintiff
testified that upon entering the lavatory she did not observe any handhold,
and that in order to turn around, she gave the steward her right crutch,
keeping the left under her arm, and placed her right hand on the tissue
container. She further testified that while she was turning around the tissue
container came open and she fell on her left leg, at the same time experiencing severe pain. She then testified that she called the steward and that she
had never closed the lavatory door. The steward and a passenger who had
helped the steward assist the plaintiff to the lavatory testified in behalf of
the defendant and said they had helped the plaintiff turn around, then took
both her crutches, closed the door and left, leaving the plaintiff situated to
use the lavatory. They further testified that when they heard the plaintiff
unlock the lavatory door they opened it, returned her crutches, and helped
her to return to her seat. The witnesses agreed that the plaintiff had rested
her right hand on the tissue container while they were turning her around
and that the container had come open, but they denied that she fell or that
she complained of having hurt herself. When she arrived at her destination,
it was found that the plaintiff had a small pathological fracture in the area
affected by the tumor, which could have been caused by the fall which she
described, by placing any substantial weight on her left leg, or by any shift
of gate. The plaintiff brought a personal injury action and contended that
the defendant was negligent in failing to place a handhold in the restroom,
and in placing an unsafe and unfit appliance, the tissue container, at a
position where a passenger would normally use it as a brace or grasp in the
absence of any other handholds. Upon hearing the testimony, the trial judge
directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that there was insufficient
evidence to prove negligence. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision, holding that although, as a
common carrier, the defendant was bound to exercise the highest degree of
case and forsight for its passenger's safety, the defendant was not an
insurer, and the mere fact of the injury was not sufficient to raise a presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant. It was not clear, the
court said, from the plaintiff's own evidence that there was no handhold in
the lavatory. However, even if there were no handhold, the court indicated
that it would not have allowed recovery. The defendant was under no duty
to furnish handholds nor to forsee that in the absence of a handhold, a
passenger would rest its weight on the tissue container, which was obviously
not provided for that purpose.

INTERROGATORIES-EXTENT TO WHICH PARTY MUST
REVEAL ITS CASE-EXCEPTION TO GENERAL
RULE IN AIRPLANE CRASHES
Merrill v. United Airlines, Inc.
5 CCH Aviation L. Rep. 17,317 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 1957).
In a wrongful death action the plaintiff prepared several interrogatories
asking the defendant if it had any knowledge as to several enumerated
factors which could have caused or contributed to the accident in which the
plaintiff's decedent had been killed. The subsequent interrogatories then
asked if the defendant would claim at the trial that one of those factors
caused or contributed to the accident and if so, what the said claim of the
defendant would be. The defendant objected to these interrogatories on the
ground that their net effect was to ask it what would be its story at the
trial. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, while recognizing that the purpose of modern federal practice is to
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eliminate, surprise and that such interrogatories would be proper in an ordinary case, held that there is an exception to the general rule in cases where
the parties would be required to commit themselves too definitely. A case
involving an airplane crash, the court continued, would be one such instance.
In airplane crashes, the defendant frequently knows little about the cause
of the accident, and yet it is asked to commit itself to a particular cause of
the accident. However, the court held that the interrogatories would be
acceptable if the one in which the defendant was asked if he would claim
that one of the enumerated factor "caused or contributed to the accident"
were changed to read "may have caused or contributed to the accident." If
such change were made, the court reasoned, the defendant would be protected
from being required to put itself in a straight jacket and still the plaintiff
would be able to get all the information to which he was entitled.

CROP DUSTING-LACK OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCEAPPLICABILITY OF STRICT LIABILITY DOCTRINE
Vrazel v. Bieri
294 S.W. 2d 148 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. Sept. 20, 1956).
Gotreaux v. Gary
5 CCH Aviation L. Rep. 17,269 (La. Feb. 25, 1957).
In the Vrazel case, the plaintiff's crops were damaged by a herbicide
which was blown onto his property during crop dusting operations taking
place on a neighboring farm. The plaintiff brought action against the farmer
whose crops were being dusted and also against the owner of the airplanes
employed in the operation, charging both defendants with negligence. At
the trial, the jury found, inter alia, that the damage to the plaintiff's crops
was caused by the herbicide which the defendants failed to keep confined
within the boundaries of the field being sprayed. However, the jury found
that this failure was not due to the defendants' negligence and, therefore,
denied recovery. On appeal, the plaintiff did not attack the findings as
lacking support in the evidence or as being contrary to the weight of the
evidence, but contended rather that the failure to confine the poison being
sprayed constituted negligence as a matter of law. Therefore, the plaintiff
argued that the jury's finding of absence of negligence was a mere conclusion of law or opinion which was "of no legal effect or significance and
[which] should be disregarded." The Texas Court of Civil Appeals, in
affirming the trial court, held that the plaintiff was in effect arguing that
the doctrine of absolute liability should be applied. That doctrine, the court
said, is not recognized in Texas, and in order to recover in a case such as
this, the plaintiff would have to obtain a finding of actionable negligence.
Since such a finding was not obtained, the defendant was entitled to
judgment.
The Gotreaux case presented essentially the same facts and the trial
court dismissed the plaintiff's action, holding that the defendants were free
from any negligence. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the defendant's
actions constituted a private nuisance and that liability for damages resulting from the maintenance of a nuisance does not depend on a question of
negligence. The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected this contention, but
nevertheless reversed the trial court. The court held that in cases where a
landowner's use of his property unreasonably inconveniences others and
deprives them of the enjoyment of their property, negligence or fault is not
a requisite of liability. Therefore, the court reasoned, strict liability should
be imposed in this case.
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PILOT'S KNOWLEDGE OF STORM CENTER ON FLIGHT PATHFAILURE TO ALTER COURSE CONSTITUTES NEGLIGENCE
Cudney v. Braniff Airways, Inc.
300 S.W. 2d 412 (Mo. Mar., 11, 1957).
The plaintiff, while a passenger on a flight of Mideontinent Airlines, was
thrown from her seat and injured when the plane hit a violent downdraft
during a thunderstorm. The plaintiff brought a personal injury action
against the pilot of the plane and against Midcontinent, and after that
airline merged with Braniff Airways, upon motion the latter was substituted
as a party defendant for and instead of Midcontinent. The evidence indicated
that before taking off on the flight, the pilot was warned by Midcontinent's
meteorologist that the route of the contemplated flight was through scattered
cumulus cloud formations conducive to thunderstorms which occasion downdrafts. In addition, while the plane was in flight, the pilot adhered to his
course and did not diminish his speed, notwithstanding the fact that the
air increased in the violence of its turbulence, that there was considerable
cloud-to-cloud lightning and some cloud-to-ground lightning, and that a few
minutes before it hit the downdraft, the plane encountered heavy rainfall.
The evidence further indicated that precipitous downdrafts of disturbed air
are more probable where there is lightning, especially cloud-to-ground lightning, and heavy rainfall. After the plane hit the downdraft, the pilot made
a ninety degree turn, and after flying in the new direction eight or nine
miles, the plane encountered no more turbulent air. Upon hearing the evidence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff; however, the
trial court set aside the verdict and entered judgment for the defendant in
accordance with the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The plaintiff
appealed on the grounds that there was sufficient evidence to establish negligence on the part of the defendant. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed
the trial court's judgment and remanded the cause with directions to reinstate the judgment for the plaintiff. In so ordering, the court held that the
evidence tended to show that the pilot knew the forecast of stormy weather
on the contemplated flight path, that he saw or could have seen the lightning,
that he flew into heavy rainfall, and that he continued in flight at undiminished speed in the rainfall. All these factors indicated that a thunderstorm
with probably dangerous currents of air therein concentrated would be
encountered on the contemplated flight plan. On the basis of this, the court
held that the jury could and did reasonably find that the defendants were
guilty in failing to take the precaution to circumnavigate the turbulent area
or in failing to diminish speed in passing through the area, or in failing to
do both.
CONDEMNATION-CHANGE IN ZONING RESTRICTIONSJUST COMPENSATION FOR LAND TAKEN
United States v. 50.8 Acres of Land
5 CCH Aviation L. Rep. 17,318 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1957).
The government filed a complaint seeking to acquire land which at that
time was zoned for residential use. Just prior to the taking, the owner of
the land had made an application for a change in zoning from residential
to industrial. This change was approved by one adjoining landowner, but
opposer by another-the government. Approximately two years after the
taking, and after the government had withdrawn its opposition, the change
in zoning was affected. At the hearing on the complaint, there was a sharp
and irreconcilable conflict between the opinions of the appraisers as to the
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value of the appropriated land.. The witness for the owner based his value
upon industrial use, whereas the government's witness based his opinion upon
residential use, which conformed to the existing zoning. In awarding compensation, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York recognized that the existing zoning restrictions were a proper and
important factor for the appraisers to consider, but held that it was also
important for the appraisers to consider the reasonable probability of a
change in fixing their estimates of valuation. To appraise the land, the court
reasoned, as though the change had occurred, when in fact it had not, would
be to totally disregard restrictions upon use, which had been imposed by
competent authority for many years, and to permit the owner to receive
compensation based on a prohibited use. However, the court continued, to
deny the owner any increment in value attributable to the probability of a
favorable change in zoning in the reasonably near future, would likewise be
unjust. Therefore, the zoning restrictions on the use as they existed at the
time and the possibility or probability of a change to industrial use in the
near future, should be viewed in the light of all the testimony presented,
and compensation should be based upon the result thereof.

